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I. INTRODUCTION
Several issues in mass tort litigation have surfaced in recent years to
focus attention on the inability of the traditional court system to adequately
handle the special demands associated with the mass tort. A particular
problem is presented by the mass tort caused by the widespread sale or use
of a dangerous or defective product. This is illustrated by both the
asbestos and the Dalkon Shield cases. While each instance of mass tort
litigation is unique, some of the issues that arise in handling such litigation
are common. The litigants may number in the thousands and the damage
may be measured by billions of dollars. Some of the problems facing
parties potentially involved in such litigation are issues of fairness to all
parties, full resolution of pertinent issues, and logistical ifficulties in
bringing suit.' While the class action has promise of being a more
efficient method of handling the special problems arising in multiple-
incident cases,2 recent court developments may have restricted its use and
availability to the widespread plaintiffs of mass tort The need remains
to find a fair solution that protects the rights of all litigants. Coupled with
the concern for fair adjudication of the rights of people affected by the
issues in multiple-incident cases is the concern that the corporations
involved in the production of dangerous or defective products be held
accountable in a serious and effective manner.4
The need for a new approach to the problem of mass tort litigation
has been demonstrated by the asbestos cases; recent studies indicate that
over the course of thirty years asbestos will account for as many as
265,000 cancer deaths.' Agent Orange,6 DES,7 and MER/29' are all
additional examples of where the nature of the damage inflicted by a mass-
marketed product affected thousands of people. The resulting litigation
1. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Case Management of Mass Ton Litigation, in PREPARATION
AND TRIAL OF A TOXIC TORT CASE 1990 (PLI Litig. Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 387, 1990).
2. See generally Irvin R.M. Panzer & Thomas E. Patton, Utilizing the Class Action
Device in Mass Ton Litigation, 21 TORT INS. L.J. 560 (1986).
3. Id.
4. See generally Miles W. Lord, Corporate Irresponsibility: The Sin With No Sinners, 9
HAMLINE L. REv. 53 (1985).
5. Harry H. Wellington, The Thirtieth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: Asbestos: The
Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 375, 376 (1984-1985).
6. See generally In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
7. See generally Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
8. See generally RALPH A. FINE, THE GREAT DRUG DECEPTION: THE SHOCKING
STORY OF MERJ29 AND THE FOLKS WHO GAvE You THALIDOMIDE (1972).
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has threatened to swamp the courts, raising the specter of interminable
delays, repetitious discovery proceedings, inconsistent damage awards,
ever-increasing legal fees, and the very real possibility that successive
awards to plaintiffs could bankrupt the company and leave the later
claimants without any funds for the satisfaction of their judgments. It was
in this context that the Claims Resolution Facility was developed as an
alternative method of resolving the asbestos litigation while preserving the
ability of plaintiffs to achieve satisfaction of their claims.
This Note will examine the Claims Resolution Facility as it is being
used to resolve the thousands of Dalkon Shield cases. A relatively new
technique in the resolution of mass tort litigation, it was initially proposed
by Dean Wellington in his capacity as moderator of a group consisting of
major asbestos producers, insurance companies, and plaintiff's lawyers.9
II. THE CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY IN ASBESTOS CASES
The special nature of the injury caused by exposure to asbestos
illustrated the need for a novel approach to the settlement of the resulting
litigation. Asbestos is a toxic mineral compound whose fibers can cause
either lung cancer or asbestosis in workers and others who have been
exposed over time.1" The diseases have a very long latency period - in
fact, the diseases may not be apparent for up to forty years.1 The nature
of the injury12 and its long latency period create special problems for
litigation.
Because of the long period of time between exposure and the
manifestation of the symptoms, it is often difficult to identify the
manufacturer responsible for the resulting injury. Consequently, plaintiffs
have taken the course of suing all relevant asbestos manufacturers under
joint and several liability. 3 The cases alleging personal injury have
usually been brought in strict product liability, with the additional claim
that the manufacturer either knew or should have known of the dangers
associated with exposure to asbestos, and that its failure to warn the public
left it liable for punitive damages as well. t" This approach was
9. Wellington, supra note 5, at 375. Mr. Wellington is Dean and Sterling Professor of
Law at Yale University.
10. Id. at 376.
11. Id.
12. Exposure to both asbestos and cigarette smoke can cause cancer; when there is
combined exposure the synergistic effects produce much higher rates of cancer than exposure
to either carcinogen alone. This factor has heightened the difficulty in accurately determining
causation.




successfully utilized in Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Products.'5
Dean Wellington cites studies which report that by the end of 1982
"approximately 400 million dollars has been paid . . . in total
compensation for asbestos-related injury.""6 He noted that the costs of
settlement over the next thirty years as the cases continue to be filed will
grow to a possible $87 billion.17 One study estimated that in addition to
the settlement costs, estimated defense costs will total in the billions over
the next thirty years." Although these numbers are staggering, the
special nature of asbestos litigation makes these projections especially
noteworthy. Because each suit typically names a large number of
defendants as jointly and severally liable, and each asbestos producer
typically has not only its own defense team but is represented by its
insurers, the sheer number of parties involved results in a duplication of
time, efforts and expenses. 9 Clearly, some coordination of defense was
necessary in order to proceed efficiently.
Dean Wellington relates the difficulties he encountered in securing
cooperation between disparate insurers and producers in order to ascertain
the amount to be contributed to the establishment of a fund capable of
settling the thousands of asbestos claims already filed.' Because the
period of exposure was typically protracted, it was difficult to ascertain
what producer was responsible for the offending asbestos. Moreover,
insurers had written policies whose coverage varied significantly; some
only covered damages due to injury and disease caused by an "occurrence"
(defined as an accident or exposure) during the policy period. Problems
with such coverage were inevitable; in many cases the manifestation of the
injury arose 15 to 40 years later. Many insurers disputed that prolonged
exposure was even an "occurrence."2 t
Some insurers insisted that coverage was triggered only by the
manifestation of the symptoms - meaning that the policies issued during
the latency period did not cover the injury.2 Others insisted that
coverage was triggered by exposure and that any policies issued after
exposure provided no coverage.2
After extensive and often acrimonious discussions, the Wellington
group was able to agree on insurance coverage satisfactory to the parties.
15. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
16. Wellington, supra note 5, at 377.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Wellington, supra note 5, at 378.
20. Id. at 379-81. Twenty-four thousand claims had already been filed by 1985.
21. Id. at 381.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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This resulted in the establishment of the Asbestos Claims Facility.' The
Facility is an independent nonprofit organization, composed of the asbestos
producers and their insurers, that "will administer and arrange for . . .
evaluation, settlement, or defense of all asbestos-related claims against [the
members of the Facility]. '2 The members are the insurers and producers
who subscribed to the agreement hammered out by the Wellington group.
When a claim is settled, the cost is allocated to all the members. If a
settlement offer is rejected, the claimant has two options: the claimant
may elect good faith negotiation, followed, if necessary, by binding
private settlement through arbitration; or he may elect negotiation,
followed by non-binding arbitration, and if necessary, by formal
litigation.' It was the hope of Dean Wellington that the procedures
outlined by his group would result in substantial savings to the insurers
and producers and would also result in more of the award going directly to
the injured plaintiff."
Due to the nature of the injuries associated with asbestos exposure
and the fact that it is often difficult to ascertain years later just when the
exposure occurred, the problems which arose in settling the asbestos
claims are significantly different than the problems encountered in the
Dalkon Shield cases. The Asbestos Claims Facility may have been the
only hope to unite the various producers and insurers, all of whom were
eager to involve as many other parties as possible in the establishment of a
fund out of which the claims would be paid. However, the issues in the
resolution of the Dalkon Shield claims are different: only one
manufacturer is involved; physicians specifically prescribed the Dalkon
Shield, eliminating problems of identifying the source of the injury; the
date of exposure can be accurately pinpointed, and the manifestation of the
symptoms can be confidently traced. So why was a Claims Resolution
Facility needed to address the claims brought by those injured by the
Dalkon Shield?
III. THE DALKON SHIELD AND THE CLAIMS FACILITY
A. Background
The Dalkon Shield is a small plastic intrauterine contraceptive
24. Id. at 387.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 388.
27. Id. at 389.
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device.' The shield is a small oval approximately the size of a dime, with
small protrusions and a tailstring intended to assist in checking for proper
placement and for use as an aid in removal. The tailstring in the Dalkon
Shield differed from the single filament strands of other IUDs in that it
was a multi-filament strand enclosed in a nylon sheath, unsealed at each
end.' This tailstring was later discovered to have a "wicking" tendency,
drawing bacteria into the sterile environment of the uterus, causing
infection.'
In 1970, A.H. Robins purchased the rights to the Dalkon Shield
from the inventors, making several modifications to the device. Without
any clinical testing on the modifications, Robins began to market the
Shield on an international scale, intensively advertising the device to both
medical and lay communities." In 1971, A.H. Robins first received
warning of the dangerous "wicking" tendency of the multi-filament string,
but the director of pharmaceutical research decided that no changes would
be made in the product.3 z In 1972, Robins received notice from one of
its clinical investigators of the danger of septic abortions in shield users
who might become pregnant.33 The clinical investigator advised the
removal of the shield once a diagnosis of pregnancy was made.' Robins
ignored the recommendation.
In the following two years Robins received 22 reports of users who
had suffered spontaneous septic abortions, one resulting in a woman's
death, while using the device. Despite knowledge of the danger involved,
Robins sent literature to the medical community specifically stating that it
was safe to leave the shield in place once a diagnosis of pregnancy was
made.35
28. The Dalkon Shield was initially designed by Dr. Hugh Davis, an associate professor
of obstetrics and gynecology at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Davis formed a small
company in 1968 to market the device and at that time began a one-year test study at a family
planning clinic. According to Dr. Davis, the shield had a very successful pregnancy rate of
1.1% during that test period. Dr. Davis published his results in the American Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, neglecting to mention, however, that he had a financial interest
in the device. He reported that the shield produced excellent results and that it was a
.superior" IUD. Palmer v. Robins, 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo. 1984).
29. Id.
30. Leslie E. Tick, Note, Beyond the Dalkon Shield: Proving Causation Against IUD
Manufacturers For PID-Related Injury, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 639, 642-43 n.21
(1983).
31. Palmer v. Robins, 684 P.2d 187, 195 (Colo. 1984).
32. Id. at 196.
33. Id. Robins had knowledge that the Shield's reported pregnancy rate of 1.1 % was
actually closer to 6%. This information was not included in the advertising for the Dalkon
Shield.
34. Id.
35. Id. This conduct is relevant to claims for punitive damages in the resulting lawsuits.
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B. Litigation
In 1975, a woman who had become pregnant while using the device
filed a suit against Robins for the injuries she sustained.36 Relying on the
literature of the Robins company, her physician decided to leave the shield
in place. Because of the "wicking" tendency of the string, the woman
suffered a spontaneous septic abortion, an involuntary miscarriage caused
by a blood-borne bacterial infection centered in the uterine area. As
described by the court in Palmer, she:
subsequently went into septic shock, a condition resulting from a
massive infection with a concomitant fall in blood pressure to a
dangerously low level. She also developed a blood disorder which
impeded natural blood clotting ability. In order to save her life, it
was necessary to perform a total hysterectomy in which her uterus,
fallopian tubes and ovaries were removed."'
The jury awarded Palmer $6,000 in compensatory damages and
$6,200,000 in punitive damages. Both awards were upheld on appeal."
Over the next few years, A.H. Robins faced an increasing number
of suits across the country; at one time Robins was faced with two
hundred suits filed in the Northern District of California alone.39  By
mid-1974 Robins finally withdrew the Dalkon Shield from the market;
however, the device was not effectively recalled until 10 years later, in
1984. 40
Faced with such volumes of litigation, the courts tried different
procedures for efficiently handling all the claims. Many courts
consolidated pre-trial proceedings under the direction of the Judicial Panel
on Multi-District Litigation, 4' hoping that such action might reduce the
difficulties of efficient disposition of the mounting Dalkon Shield case
load. After accepting the transfer of a number of such cases, the Panel
concluded that as much had been achieved as possible in reducing pre-trial
proceedings, and it began to vacate later transfer orders, returning the
36. Id. at 197.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 198.
39. In re Northern Dist. of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983).
40. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709. 711 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
959 (1989).
41. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 406 F.
Supp. 540 (J.P.M.L. 1975); 419 F. Supp. 710 (D.ML 1976); 438 F. Supp. 942 (D.ML
1977). (The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred three cases to the District
of Kansas under the consolidated name of In re A.H. Robins Co., "Dalkon Shield," Etc., no.
211, since the action appeared to share common factual questions.)
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cases for further proceedings to the respective transferor courts. In the
words of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
[w]hile these proceedings before the Judicial Panel had aided the
problems of discovery in the Dalkon Shield cases, they did nothing to
relieve the clogging of court calendars by the constantly increasing
stream of Dalkon Shield cases to be tried nor did they reduce
substantially the trial time of the cases. It was manifest that other
measures were required if this overloading of the courts with Dalkon
Shield cases was to be relieved.42
In another attempt to streamline the course of handling so many
suits, Judge Miles Lord of the Minnesota District Court consolidated a
large number of Dalkon Shield suits and appointed a lead counsel to
handle discovery. Judge Lord appointed two masters to sift through all the
material discovered and all material that developed in their own
independent investigations. These masters were to report to the court and
to the counsel on all relevant material contained in the files of Robins and
its insurer, Aetna. The lead counsel then catalogued all the material that
resulted from this expedited discovery.'
The suits before Judge Lord were settled for $38 million and
consequently, no further proceedings were necessary. However, the
material discovered by the lead counsel was made available to counsel of
other Dalkon Shield cases.'
Another attempt to handle the overwhelming volume of Dalkon
Shield cases was the use of the class action. This approach was initially
unsuccessful.' In In re Northern District of California, "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Products Liability Litigation,' the Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded the District Court ruling allowing class certification, stating that:
The few issues that might be tried on a class basis in this case,
balanced against issues [such as causation and damages] that must be
tried individually, indicate that the time saved by a class action may
be relatively insignificant. A few verdicts followed by settlem-ents
might be equally efficacious. 47




45. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978),
appeal dismissed, 385 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1978); In re Northern Dist. of California "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
46. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cer. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
47. Id. at 856.
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This seems to suggest the possibility of certification of the class in order to
achieve settlement of the claims. A continuing concern of the attorneys
representing the plaintiffs in the increasing volume of Dalkon Shield cases
was that the later plaintiffs to win awards might be disadvantaged by the
exhaustion of funds available to pay the awards.' This "limited fund"
concept had been argued as necessitating the certification of the class for
punitive damages under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). At the time of the
attempt to certify the class in In re Northern District of California,
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation,49 there were 1,573
suits involving claims for compensatory damages of well over $500
million, while the net worth of A.H. Robins was only $300 million. This
raised the "unconscionable possibility that large numbers of plaintiffs who
are not first in line at the courthouse door will be deprived of a practical
means of redress. ,0
Yet another attempt to certify a class occurred as the result of an
action filed in the Eastern District Court of Virginia by A.H. Robins itself
in 1984. Robins, under the "limited fund" concept,"' sought to certify a
nationwide class action of the claims for punitive damages in all pending
Dalkon Shield cases. '  Certification was denied. The District Judge
construed the California decision as having held that the Rule 23(a)
requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequate representation were
not met, and that such a decision, under the principles of collateral
estoppel, barred this request for certification.A
One more attempt at certifying a class for the maintenance of the
Dalkon Shield suits was proposed, again asserting that A.H. Robins was
insolvent and that the value of the outstanding claims exceeded the value
of the company, thereby exposing later claimants to economic prejudice at
the hands of more timely filed claims. The action sought a gross
judgment, the proceeds of which would be equitably distributed among the
Dalkon Shield claimants under an alternative dispute resolution process.'
Robins opposed the certification and denied insolvency. However, soon
48. See Emily Couric, Bankruptcy: The A.H. Robins Saga, 72 A.B.A. J. 56 (1986).
49. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp.
1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
50. Id. at 1191.
51. Sharon Youdelmen, Note, Strategic Bankruptcies: Class Actions, Classification and
the Dalkon Shield Cases. 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 817 (1986). The author notes that Robins'
attempt to impose a class action on its claimants is quite likely to be imitated in the future by
besieged corporations. The author explains that this is because the limited fund class action
provides the corporation with all of the protections of bankruptcy, while imposing few of the
costs.
52. In re Dalkon Shield Punitive Damages Litig.. 613 F. Supp. 1112, 1113 (E.D. Va.
1985).
53. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 1989).
54. This request resembled what was later instituted as the Claims Facility.
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afterward, Robins filed Chapter 11 proceedings. Since the Chapter 11
filing, the motion for class certification has remained dormant.s
At this point in 1985, an average of seventy cases per week were
being filed against Robins, seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages.' Very large awards were being returned against Robins; the
verdict in one case amounted to over $9 million. Such results led
plaintiffs to become very apprehensive of the ability of Robins to meet the
liabilities being asserted in the pending cases. Future suits sought to
include Robins' insurer, Aetna, as a "deep pocket" defendant with the
capability of satisfying the claims asserted.' These suits bore no fruit,
as they were unable to show that Aetna was a joint tortfeasor with
Robins.-9
However, in 1984, Aetna and Robins agreed to a compromise
settlement in which Aetna agreed to provide additional coverage above
Aetna's claimed limit of $300 million. Disagreement remained over the
amount of remaining liability, if any, under Aetna's policy for the payment
of judgments against the Dalkon Shield claims.' By the time A.H.
Robins filed for reorganization on August 21, 1985, it had settled 9,238
claims for approximately $530 million and still faced over 5,000 claims
pending in state and federal courts. 6i
After A.H. Robins' request for certification of the class had been
denied in 1984, it filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.' As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the
parties had been developing a plan of reorganization.' A fundamental
55. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 1989).
56. In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555, 557 (E.D. Va. 1988).
57. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins, Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (1987). The court upheld an award of
$1.7 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million in punitive damages, owing to the
clear evidence that officers of A.H. Robins not only knew of the dangerous "wicking"
tendencies of the Dalkon Shield, but concealed the evidence by attempting to destroy
documents relating to their awareness of the "wicking" problem.
58. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 1989); Bast v. A.H.
Robins Co., 616 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
59. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 1989).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 717.
62. In re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R, 89 B.R. 555 (E.D. Va. 1988). Because
Chapter I I reorganization is voluntary, there is no insolvency requirement, and the debtor
may continue in a reorganization plan providing for the payment of funds to various classes
of creditors.
63. Chapter I I Reorganization allows the debtor to discharge his debts based on a plan
of reorganization in which creditors, either by consent or through the operation of protective
provisions, accept less than the full amount of their debts. In reorganization, the debtor's
business continues in a modified form and the creditors receive payments from the future
earnings of the reorganized business. John P. Bums ET AL., Special Project, An Analysis of
the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573,
808 (Charles D. Maguire, Jr. & Laurin Blumenthal eds., 1983).
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step involved the estimation of unliquidated claims against A.H.
Robins." The value of the unliquidated claims was set at $2.475 billion
by District Judge Merhige. He informed all the parties that no plan of
reorganization would be considered which failed to provide this amount for
the full payment of all Dalkon Shield claims.' In April 1986, lawyers
for the claimants filed a class action against Aetna as a joint tortfeasor."
At this time, American Home Products Corporation made an offer
of merger with A.H. Robins which would provide the sum required by the
District Judge. In order to insure itself against all Dalkon Shield liability,
American Home Products made its offer contingent upon a settlement of
all Dalkon Shield claims against all parties. At this point, it became clear
that the negotiations for settlement of the suits against Robins and Aetna
had to be merged with the proceedings of reorganization under Chapter
I L' The procedure adopted to achieve this merger involved the
establishment of a trust fund to consist of $2.475 billion, funded primarily
by the payment of American Home in connection with its acquisition of
A.H. Robins.' Because the liability of Robins in the Dalkon Shield
litigation was direct and that of Aetna was only as a possible joint
tortfeasor, the contribution of Aetna was considerably less. Aetna
provided $75 million and four policies of insurance, totaling $250 million
to be used if the funds in the trust were insufficient to meet the payment of
the outstanding claims. Under the terms of the agreement, all claims of
the Dalkon Shield claimants against both Robins and Aetna were to be
converted into claims solely against the trust fund. Robins, Aetna, and
American Home were to be absolutely released from all liability. 69
C. The Trust Fund and The Claims Resolution Facility
Under the terms of the agreement, the trust fund was to be
administered by five trustees, who were to create the Claims Resolution
64. See Note, The Manville Banknptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983); David Kaufman, Note, Procedures for
Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 153 (1982)
(stating that the process of estimation of unliquidated claims provided by the Bankruptcy
Code is a lengthy procedure).
65. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 720 (4th Cir. 1989).
66. The suit was brought by seven individual claimants, suing on their own behalf and
as class representatives of all injuriqs to Dalkon Shield claimants. The suit sought recovery
from Robins' insurer on the theory that the conduct of Aetna, while acting as an insurer of
Robins, was such as to render itself liable as a joint tortfeasor for any injuries sustained by
persons while using the device. During consideration whether to give final certification to
the class, the parties entered into a settlement of the action conditioned on certification of the
class. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 710.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 722.
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Facility which would resolve the liability due each claimant. During the
bankruptcy proceedings, notice had been sent to all claimants throughout
the world that they must file claims in the bankruptcy proceeding, or their
claims against Robins would be barred.7" As a result, several hundred
thousand claims were filed.' The purpose of the Facility was to evaluate
each claim on the basis of detailed questionnaires and medical information
submitted by each claimant. The Facility would then award an amount to
each individual claimant sufficient to settle the claim. Originally, the plan
called for the Facility to attempt to resolve the issue of liability in each
individual case by negotiation between the Facility, the claimant, and her
attorney (if she had one). If the resolution of the claim could not be
accomplished through negotiation, the claimant would be granted the
option of having the claim resolved through either binding arbitration or
by a jury trial. It was stipulated that should any claimant elect to resolve
her claim by suit, venue of such trial would be unchanged by the Chapter
11 case, and the right to a jury trial would be preserved.'
One important factor in the agreement was the issue of punitive
damages. Whereas early claimants had received in excess of $6 million,
the Plan provided that:
[any portion of any Dalkon Shield Claim that is a Claim for punitive
damages is a Disallowed Claim; provided, however, that holders of
Dalkon Shield Claims subject to the Claims Resolution Facility are
entitled to receive from the Claimants Trust any sums payable in lieu
of punitive damages pursuant to the Claims Resolution Facility.'
The trustees were charged with the responsibility of evaluating
claims and expediting recovery. As outlined by Bankruptcy Judge
Blackwell N. Shelley:
It is the responsibility of the Trustees to ascertain the fair value of
the injuries and make an equitable settlement according to the option
procedures created in the Claims Resolution Facility Agreement.
This Court charges them with the additional responsibility to
distribute the funds in the Trust to worthy claimants as soon as
possible.
74
The Plan, as it developed, established four options, each of which
70. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1989).
71. In re A.H. Robins Co., 862 F.2d 1092, 1093 (4th Cir. 1989).
72. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 722 (4th Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 722 n.16.
74. "Judges React," CLAIMS RESOL. REP. (Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, Richmond,
Va.), No. 3, at I (quoting Bankruptcy Judge Blackwell N. Shelley's reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision not to review the Reorganization Plan or the related Breland Class Action).
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detailed the level of injury and nature of the proof necessary to establish a
recovery. Claims submitted without any medical records to prove use of
the Dalkon Shield, or those which indicated relatively minor injuries, are
classified as Option One claims. These claims are not evaluated and
recovery under Option One is limited to $750. Furthermore, a claimant
who selects Option One will not be allowed to select any other option at a
later date.7'
Option Two claims are subjected to limited review. This Option is
for claimants who can establish that they used the Dalkon Shield and
suffered an injury. Proof is required through submission of medical
records. Under Option Two, it is expected that a claimant will recover
greater payments than those in Option One.76 Option Three provides the
best hope of recovery for injuries which can be traced to the Dalkon
Shield. Claimants must submit detailed questionnaires and medical
records, which are subjected to a full review. Payments are intended to be
consistent with those for similar injuries which were achieved through
litigation. If the settlement amount offered by the Facility under Option
Three is deemed insufficient by the claimant, she may proceed to
mediation, followed by arbitration or trial. However, once a claimant
chooses to proceed under Option Three, she forfeits her opportunity to
seek review under Options One and Two.77 A fourth Option is available
to those who might become injured later, or whose existing injuries
worsen. When such a claim becomes active, the claimant will then select
one of the other options available. In addition, the trust has established a
special program for reconstructive surgery and in vitro fertilization for
women whose use of the Dalkon Shield has left them permanently
injured. '
D. Is the Claims Resolution Facility the Right Answer?
By producing a dangerously defective IUD, A.H. Robins subjected
hundreds of thousands of women to risks of spontaneous abortions,
massive infections, sterility, and in some cases, death. 79 By failing to
recall the Dalkon Shield for 14 years, A.H. Robins increased the scope of
the injuries, and subjected itself and the court system to litigation that
threatened to overwhelm the resources of both the company and the
75. "Your Options," CLAIMS RESOL. REP.. (Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. Richmond,




79. CHICAGO DAILY L.J., Nov. 6. 1989, at 1.
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courts. Attempts at class certification were unsuccessful and eventually
the Claims Resolution Facility was developed in an attempt to settle the
hundreds of thousands of suits still pending. But does this method of
dispute resolution offer a real solution to the problem of the mass tort?
The purpose of the tort system is to redress wrongs by awarding an
amount in damages to one injured by the acts of another. In cases of
recklessly negligent conduct, punitive damages are seen as a way of
punishing the wrongdoer and deterring wrongful conduct s "especially
where that conduct results in 'foreseeably avoidable and all too often
catastrophic injuries from defective products.'"' One authority has
noted that punitive damages in products litigation takes on a greater role,
serving as a societal curb on manufacturers' conduct by exposing and
punishing misdeed, with the additional effect of eliminating unfair profit
gained at the expense of the injuredY2  However, the Claims Resolution
Facility has eliminated the possibility of punitive damages. By filing
Chapter 11, at a time when it was not bankrupt,' A.H. Robins was able
to limit its liability to a specified amount. The aims of the traditional tort
system have been altered and instead, a process has been substituted which
offers protection to the producer of the dangerous product while attempting
to address the injuries of the consumers who relied on it. Is this an
improvement?
First, one must decide what factors indicate success. Is it the
continued viability of the company or is it the easing of the overwhelming
numbers of court cases on the dockets of an already stressed court system?
One prominent plaintiffs' attorney has suggested that the needs of the
women have been left unaddressed in the attempt to allow A.H. Robins a
chance to regroup and recover from the devastating consequences of
marketing the defective IUD.' For example, although the Supreme
Court resolved the last challenge to the settlement in October 1989,
resolution of the Option Three claims has been distressingly slow. The
Trust reported that by April 15, 1990 it had made offers to over 800 of
the 1,700 claimants who at that time had elected Option Two; conversely,
80. "Punitive damages ... remain as the most effective remedy of consumer protection
against defectively designed mass produced articles, They provide motive for private
individuals to enforce rules of law and enable them to recoup the expense of doing so."
Tetuan v. A.H. Robins, 738 P.2d 1210, 1239 (Kan. 1987) (quoting Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
81. Laura Greenberg, Note, Punitive Damages in Mass-Marketed Products Litigation, 14
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 405, 407 (1981).
82. Id. at 407-08 (citing lgoe, Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 34 J. Mo. B.
394, 405 (1978)).
83. See In Re A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R, 89 B.R. 555 (E.D. Va. 1988).
84. Telephone interview with Thomas Brandi, attorney, Bianco, Brandi & Jones (Nov.
1990).
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of the 1,600 claimants who had elected Option Three, as of April 15, only
three had received offers by that date.s
The Claims Resolution Facility has emerged as an unusual form of
alternative dispute resolution. While the Plan calls for mediation upon the
receipt of an unsatisfactory offer, in reality, claimants have no opportunity
of mediation. Once an offer has been made, a claimant may elect to
accept the offer or reject it, in which case a settlement conference will be
scheduled. After the settlement conference has been scheduled, the claim
receives another in-depth review. The amounts offered to the claimants
have occasionally been reduced at this point, or they may actually
increase.' The settlement conference is an informal session at which the
representative of the Trust will explain the basis for the offer; however,
negotiation is not permitted. Claimants must schedule settlement
conferences if the offer is rejected, but they need not attend. 87
After claimants have scheduled settlement conferences, they must
wait 90 days before becoming eligible to choose binding arbitration or
litigation.' Once a claim proceeds to either binding arbitration or
litigation, a claimant is still bound by the holdback provision contained in
the Administrative Order issued by Judge Merhige.s' Under the terms of
the Order, claimants who proceed to arbitration or litigation and receive an
award or judgment greater than the offer tendered by the Trust, may still
85. Option 2 & 3 Settlement Awarded, CLAIMS RESOL. REP. (Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust, Richmond, Va.), May 1990. at 1.
86. Telephone interview with Laura Taylor. Coordinator, Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
(February 7, 1992).
87. 'I'd Like to Know,' CLAIMS RESOL. REP. (Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
Richmond, Va.), March 1991, at 3.
88. Id.
89. In re A.H. Robins Co., Chapter 11, No. 85-01307-R, U.S. Bank. Ct. (E.D. Va.
1991).
No levy against the Trustees, the Trust or its assets may be made as a
result of any Arbitration or Litigation. Until further order of this Court, in
order to assure the continued availability of funds to pay all valid Dalkon
Shield Personal Injury Claims and in order to further the other proper
purposes of the Plan. Trust and CRF. in satisfaction of all awards or
judgments (including awards or judgments of costs, fees or disbursements)
obtained as a result of Arbitration or Litigation, the Trust shall:
a. pay initially only that portion of such an award or
judgment which does not exceed the greater of $10,000 or the
final settlement offer made by the Trust under Option 3
and
b. after the payment in full of all valid, timely Dalkon
Shield Personal Injury Claims which are settled under Options
1 or 2 or under Option 3, . . . or at such time as the Trustees
are satisfied that all valid, timely Dalkon Shield Personal Injury
Claims can be fully paid, next pay pro rata from any Trust
assets available for that purpose the unpaid balances of all
Arbitration awards and Litigation judgments.
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only receive the greater of $10,000 or the Trust's initial offer. The
remainder of the award or judgment will be paid pro rata along with all
other unpaid arbitration awards and judgments in litigation only after the
Trustees are certain that there will be enough money available to make
adequate settlement offers to all other claimants."°
In consequence, many women with serious injuries and sterility, who
have received what they consider to be inadequate offers from the Trust,
are still waiting for a final resolution of their claims,9' and are likely to
wait even longer. The Claims Resolution Facility is now estimating that
all Option Three claims should have received offers by July of 1995.'
Compounding the problem for many women who have rejected settlement
offers are the long delays in the scheduling of settlement conferences. The
Claims Resolution Facility will only schedule conferences when there are
sufficient numbers of claimants in a geographical area to warrant the
conference. This has resulted in unconscionable delays. Women who
suffered hysterectomies and filed claims over ten years ago have, in some
instances, not even been scheduled for settlement conferences yet.Y
While the parties have been struggling with issues of class
certification and establishment of the trust fund, more than five years have
elapsed with no money awarded to thousands of women who suffered the
most grievous injuries. Many women have had to endure not only the
physical injuries resulting from the use of the Dalkon Shield, but severe
emotional scarring resulting from the loss of their reproductive capacity.
Many victims pursued litigation in the hope of recovering enough money
to allow reconstructive surgery, or to seek the counseling needed to deal
with such a grievous loss.9'
It will be difficult to assess the actual effectiveness of the Claims
Resolution Facility in addressing the rights of these women as the offers
made to claimants are confidential. It is possible that their rights would
have been better protected by continuing to seek redress in the traditional
tort system.9s However, this consideration is offset by the possibility that
exhaustion of funds due to high awards to early litigants could have totally
90. Judges Approve Order, CLAIMS RESOL. REP. (Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
Richmond, Va.), August 1991, at 1.
91. Telephone interview with Thomas Brandi, attorney, Bianco, Brandi & Jones
(January 31, 1992).
92. Telephone interview with Laura Taylor, Coordinator, Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust
(February II, 1992).
93. Telephone interview with Thomas Brandi, attorney, Bianco, Brandi & Jones
(January 31, 1992).
94. Id.
95. In fact, thousands of women injured by the Dalkon Shield have decided to head back
into court after rejecting the settlement offers tendered by the Facility. A hearing has been
scheduled for January 7, 1992 before District Judge Merhige. See Laura Myers, "Dalkon
Shield Users Heading Back To Coutr." THE RECORDER, Nov. 14, 1991, at 2.
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disadvantaged those who filed later. The establishment of the trust fund
clearly protects these later filers.
Another criticism leveled at the establishment of the Claims
Resolution Facility is that by removing the threat of punitive damages and
by setting caps on awards, companies, such as A.H. Robins, have lost the
inherent incentive to produce reliable products;' the awards for injuries
could be borne simply as a cost of doing business.
After the lengthy hearings for the Dalkon Shield litigation before
Judge Miles Lord, he wrote:
[w]ithin our capitalist system there are many temptations to take
shortcuts, which on a short-range basis, will mean instant profits but
will also bring about disastrous consequences for humanity in the
long-run ... It is the very nature of the corporate structure, and the
nature of the legal system that regulates that corporate structure,
which causes some corporations to commit acts that no individual
ever would do personally. The fact that a corporation has no
conscience, the fact that group action allows individuals to sublimate
their individual responsibility to the mob psychology, and the fact
that some individuals in lesser positions must accomodate the
management's wishes, all contribute to acts of wrongdoing that no
individual would do personally.'
This observation strongly suggests that any procedure that removes
the institutional restraints on corporate irresponsibility might tend to
increase societal risk. The avoidance of punitive damages might
conceivably make the cost of injuries bearable as costs of doing business.
It is imporant to recognize the role played by the tort system in
focusing the issues to be resolved in the settlement procedure. As a result
of all the earlier litigation many relevant facts were uncovered in the
discovery procedures: facts that created the pressure on A.H. Robins to
acknowledge the validity of the thousands of outstanding claims. The very
fact that the court system was swamped with claims, accompanied by
media attention, led to the willingness of A.H. Robins to finally consent to
settlement procedures.
In the final analysis, the evaluation of the effectiveness and
desirability of the Claims Resolution Facility must await the determination
of the Option Three and Option Four Claims. If these review procedures
do in fact award substantial amounts to the women who suffered grievous
injuries, it would do much to lessen the criticisms leveled at the Facility to
the effect that the rights of the victims have been ignored in the attempt to
protect the rights of A.H. Robins.
96. See supra note 94.




The use of the Claims Facility in both the asbestos cases and the
Dalkon Shield cases followed intense litigation which produced some very
high awards. In both instances, the companies involved, when faced with
ever-increasing numbers of suits, sought the protection offered by
bankruptcy proceedings. In both instances, the traditional court system
appeared to be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the cases. The
Claims Facility appeared to offer a solution which would allow all
claimants to recover for their injuries while removing the congestion
created by thousands of cases litigating essentially the same issues. The
Facility offers several advantages to victims of a mass tort. It assures all
victims of at least some monetary recovery while eliminating the need to
have an attorney and pay the attendant fees; it offers a less stress-filled
opportunity to achieve recovery than does litigation;' it allows recovery
even for those unable to fully prove injuries.
But there are sacrifices associated with the use of the Claims Facility
that must be recognized. The Facility only emerges as a useful option
after many litigants have blazed a trail through the court system, proving
the legitimacy of the damage caused by the product, and revealing the
potential for thousands more claims to be filed. In establishing the
Facility, the court must estimate the value of the outstanding claims and of
those yet to be filed. This figure may severely underestimate the amount
of money needed to settle, as has happened in the asbestos cases, leaving
later victims in no better position than they would have endured under the
traditional tort recovery. Additionally, claimants may need the advocacy
skills of attorneys when their cases pose different issues. Claimants may
be traumatized by the extent of their injuries and be unable to handle their
cases on their own, despite the best efforts of the designers of the Claims
98. Miles W. Lord. The Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised Annotated Reprimand by
Chief Judge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 7, 9 (1985). On February 29, 1984,
District Judge Miles Lord issued a reprimand to the corporate officers of A.H. Robins
following the litigation in his court. He charged the officers and attorneys for A.H. Robins
with corporate dishonesty and irresponsibility and violation of moral and ethical principles.
He wrote:
[i]f one poor young man were by some act of his, without authority or
consent, to inflict such damage upon one woman, he would be jailed for a
good portion for the rest of his life. And yet your company, without warning
to women, invaded their bodies by millions and caused them injuries by the
thousands. And when the time came for these women to make their claim
against your company, you attacked their characters, you inquired into their
sexual practices and into the identity of their sex partners. You exposed these
women and ruined families and reputations and careers in order to intimidate
those who would raise their voices against you. You introduced issues that
had no relationship whatsoever to the fact that you planted in the bodies of
these women instruments of death, mutilation, and of disease.
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Facility. Finally, although most Option Three claims must still be settled,
it seems apparent that without the added award for punitive damages,
recoveries will necessarily be much lower under the Facility than in the
courts.
There are no easy answers. The Claims Facility appears to have
preserved the ability of those injured by the marketing of a dangerously
defective product to achieve at least some recovery. The real significance
may only emerge after all Option Three claims have been settled. If
awards are made which are commensurate with earlier awards and with
the injury suffered, the Claims Facility may be a truly beneficial
innovation and a boon to the tort system.
But for those who see the threat of huge awards and the imposition
of punitive damages as the best curb on corporate irresponsibility, the
Facility poses a dangerous alternative that shields a corporation from the
full extent of its liability, allowing business as usual once a sum has been
set aside to satisfy the claims. In 1984, Chief Judge Lord, while
addressing the corporate officers of A.H. Robins, expressed the fear that
the only lesson to be learned from the behavior of A.H. Robins to date
was "that it pays to delay compensating victims, and to intimidate, harass
and shame your victims, the injured parties."" Perhaps if that is still the
lesson to be learned after more than 17 years of litigation and settlement
efforts arising from the injuries caused by the Dalkon Shield.
Peggy McCollum
99. Id. at 11.
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